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CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN SCHOOLS:





Criminal jurisdiction over Indian land has been described as "a
complex and confusing maze of federal, state, and tribal jurisdic-
tion."' This jurisdictional confusion can pose serious problems
with regard to law enforcement in Indian schools. Jurisdictional
uncertainty can lead to multiple prosecution problems or a legal
vacuum, with no governmental unit taking responsibility for law
enforcement.
Chilocco Indian School is under the control of the United States
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and located
on approximately 5,800 acres in Chilocco, Oklahoma.' Historical-
ly, there has been confusion as to which unit of government had
jurisdiction for law and order purposes at Chilocco Indian
School. 3 In 1967, the Field Solicitor for the United States Depart-
ment of the Interior, Anadarko, Oklahoma Region, reported to
the Regional Solicitor, Tulsa, Oklahoma Region, that Chilocco In-
dian School officials encountered difficulties in obtaining local law
enforcement assistance, and that the problem had been in ex-
istence since the 1950's. 4 However, in the last decade the District
Attorney for Kay County, Oklahoma, has exercised criminal
jurisdiction over the school.' Even with this current exercise of
authority, there is continued controversy over whether the federal
or state authorities possess criminal jurisdiction." The purpose of
this note is to explore the issue of criminal jurisdiction over Indian
schools in general by examining the legal arguments as they relate
to Chilocco Indian School specifically, realizing that the history of
the school is unique in many respects.
1. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional
Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503,575 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Clinton].
2. Letter from Jimmy Baker, Superintendent of Chilocco Indian School, to Noma Gurich
(Jan. 25, 1978).
3. Memorandum Letter from Leon Wall, Superintendent of Chilocco Indian School, to
Area Director of Education, Anadarko Area Office (Nov. 30, 1966).
4. Memorandum Letter from Lyle Griffis, Field Solicitor, Anadarko, Okla., U.S. Dep't
of the Interior, to Regional Solicitor, Tulsa, Oklahoma region, U.S. Dep't of the Interior
(Feb. 27, 1967).
5. State v. Grass, FRJ-78-4 (Kay County District Court, June 8, 1978); State v. Wa-
baunsee, No. CRM-76-108 (Kay County District Court, 1976).
6. Id.
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Historical Background
As is so often the case in any area of the law, the current state of
the law with respect to criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands is a
product of a historical conglomeration of many separate, and
often contradictory, statutes.7 Hence, a brief summary of some of
the major legislative acts in this field will place the current state of
the law in proper perspective.
In 1834,' Congress extended federal jurisdiction to matters in-
volving Indians with non-Indians in Indian country' and exempted
all Indians from federal jurisdiction for all crimes committed
against other Indians within Indian country. Such matters were
handled by the tribal courts on Indian reservations. ' The Federal
Major Crimes Act of 1885 reextended federal jurisdiction over
matters involving Indians and other Indians for certain
enumerated major crimes committed on Indian reservations."
Under this Act, the lesser offenses were still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the tribal governments. In 1887, Congress granted
to the states jurisdiction over allotted Indian lands, even though
the restrictions on alienation were not extinguished.'2 The General
Allotment Act of 1887'" was amended by Congress in 1906" to
defer the assumption of state jurisdiction over allotted Indian land
until the patent in fee on the land had actually issued, except for
7. For an excellent discussion of the historical development of statutory law and case law
relative to Indian criminal jurisdiction, see Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction
Over Indian Lands: The HistoricalPerspective, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 951 (1975).
8. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(1970)).
9. There was no comprehensive definition of "Indian country" until 1948, when Con-
gress established a definition for matters of criminal jurisdiction. Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
645, § 1151 (1970), which provides that: "Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and
1156 of this title, the term 'Indian country', as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within
the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through
the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether
within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments the Indian titles to
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same."
10. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(1970)).
11. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (current version at 18
U.S.C. 1153 (1970)).
12. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-
358 (1970)).
13. id.
14. Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (1906) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 349
(1970)).
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such lands in the Indian Territory." On June 25, 1948,'" Congress
reasserted its jurisdiction over all matters within Indian country"
except where both parties were Indians or the sole-party Indian
had already been punished by local tribal law.'" In addition, Con-
gress reasserted its jurisdiction with respect to certain enumerated
major crimes occurring within Indian country, even when com-
mitted by an Indian against another Indian."8
This brief historical background illustrates that the policies
regarding jurisdiction over Indian lands have often fluctuated,
leading to the current confused state of the law in this area. This
confusion is complicated by the fact that three governmental en-
tities can claim authority over Indian lands: state government,
federal government, and tribal government."0 In an attempt to
clarify the jurisdictional situation at Chilocco Indian School, this
note will consider three questions: (1) Does the school fall within
the jurisdiction of the state of Oklahoma or within the jurisdiction
of the federal government; (2) What are the ramifications of con-
current state and federal jurisdiction; and (3) Are there workable
solutions to the problems of law enforcement at the school?
Indian Country
It is clear that a state cannot exercise jurisdiction over any land
which is defined as Indian country in Section 1151 of Title 18,
United States Code. Therefore, Oklahoma does not have criminal
jurisdiction over Chilocco Indian School if it is "Indian country,"2'
or if the crime committed is a crime under the Federal Major
is. Id. at 34 Stat. 183 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1970)).
16. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (current verson at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1160
(1970)).
17. Id. at 62 Stat. 757 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970)).
18. Id. at 62 Stat. 757 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970)).
19. Id. at 62 Stat. 758 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. 1976)).
20. Clinton, supra note 1, at 504.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970) provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by law,
the general laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any
place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of
Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.
"This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or
property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian country
who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipula-
tions, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes
respectively."
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Crimes Act.2" However, if Chilocco Indian School is not "Indian
country" within the meaning of Section 1151 of Title 18, United
States Code, then there is a possible basis in law for the state of
Oklahoma to exercise criminal jurisdiction, concurrently with the
federal government, over the Chilocco Indian School.
The statutory definition of "Indian country" includes Indian
reservations,' "dependent Indian communities,"24 and "all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights of way running through the same."2 There is no
evidence that Chilocco Indian School is an Indian allotment
within the above definition of Indian country."' A "dependent In-
dian community" is a distinct Indian community located on com-
munally owned lands held in fee simple, rather than located on an
Indian reservation. 7 Clearly, Chilocco Indian School is not includ-
ed within this definition. The mere presence of a group of Indians
in a particular area is not enough to establish a dependent Indian
community.' Therefore, Chilocco Indian School must be an In-
dian reservation in order to be properly classified as Indian coun-
try.20
The determination of whether lands are considered Indian coun-
try does not turn on the label used in designating them, nor on the
manner in which the lands in question were acquired."' Rather, the
test is whether such lands have been set apart for the use, occupan-
cy, and protection of dependent Indian peoples,' and such deter-
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. 1976), which provides, in pertinent part, that: "Any Indian
who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the
following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnaping, rape, carnal knowledge of
any female not his wife, who has not attained the age of sixteen years, assault with intent to
commit rape, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery, and larceny
within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other per-
sons committing any of the above offenses, with the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States ......
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1970).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1970).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (1970).
26. The term "allotment" refers to "a selection of specific land awarded to an individual
allottee from a common holding." Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 142 (1972).
27. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). See also United States v. Mar-
tine, 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971). Section 1151(b) is a codification of Sandoval. Clifton,
supra note 1, at 508.
28. United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971); State v. Cutnose, 532 P.2d
896 (N.M. 1974).
29. 18U.S.C. § 1151 (a) (1970).
30. See United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971); Youngbear v. Brewer,
415 F. SLpp. 807 (N.D. Iowa, 1976).
31. United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938); Youngbear v. Brewer, 415 F. Supp.
807 (N.D. Iowa 1976).
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mination is a question of fact." A brief consideration of the events
which led to the establishment of the Chilocco Indian School will
be useful in determining the purpose for which the school was
created.
Chilocco Indian School, also known as Chilocco Indian School
Reserve, is located in an area formerly held by the Cherokee Na-
tion, known as the Cherokee Outlet." On December 29, 1835, the
United States government ceded certain lands located in Indian
Territory to the Cherokee Nation, on which the Cherokees were
to be settled following their removal from areas in the
southeastern United States. 4 Most of the land was located in what
is now eastern Oklahoma, but the Cherokees were also given a
"strip" of land across Indian Territory, known as the "outlet to the
west.""
On July 19, 1866, the Cherokee Nation negoitated a new treaty
in which the United States was granted the right to"settle friendly
Indians in any part of the Cherokee Country west of 96'.""'  The
United States government took advantage of this clause and set-
tled several tribes within that area, including the Pawnees in 1876 1
and the Poncas in 1878." In 1882, the United States Congress
authorized the establishment of an industrial school to be located
"at a point in Indian Territory adjacent to the southern boundary
of the State of Kansas and near to the Ponca and Pawnee Reserva-
tions."'" In 1884, Chilocco Industrial School Reserve was estab-
lished by executive order of President Chester A. Arthur." By
prior agreement with the Cherokees in 1866,' the land for the
school was purchased by the United States government."- In 1893,
the United States government purchased the remainder of the
lands in the Cherokee Outlet and opened the area to public settle-
ment, with Chilocco exempted from such settlement. 3
32. State v. Cutnose, 532 P.2d 896 (N.M. 1974).
33. Treaty of New Echota, 7 Stat. 478 (1835).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Treaty with the Cherokee Indians, 14 Stat. 799 (1866).
37. Act of Apr. 10, 1876, ch. 51, 19 Stat. 28.
38. Act of May 27, 1878, ch. 142, 20 Stat. 63, 76.
39. Act of May 17, 1882, ch. 163, 22 Stat. 68, 85. See 1 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN
AFFAIRS-LAWS AND TREATIES 198 (1904). See also Act of Mar. 1, 1883, ch. 61, 22 Stat. 433,
448.
40. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Executive Orders Relating To Indian Reservations 141
(1975) (Executive Order of July 12, 1884, President Chester A. Arthur).
41. Treaty with the Cherokee Indians, 14 Stat. 799 (1866).
42. Act of Mar. 3,1893, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 612.
43. Id.
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Given this historical background, it is useful to examine the ac-
tual language used in establishing Chilocco Indian School. The Ex-
ecutive Order of July 12, 1884, by President Chester A. Arthur,
which established the Chilocco Industrial School Reserve, stated,
in pertinent part, that:
It is hereby ordered that the following-described tracts of
country in the Indian Territory... are hereby, reserved and
set apart for the settlement of such friendly Indians belonging
within the Indian Territory as have been or who may
hereafter be educated at the Chilocco Indian Industrial
School in said Territory."
The words of grant used in establishing Chilocco Indian School
are not determinative of the issue of whether the area is Indian
country. The United States Supreme Court recognized that the
word "reservation" has many different meanings when it held that
the mere reservation of public land from sale for any purpose does
not make the land Indian country." The language "reserved and
set apart" is common to the creation of other Indian schools in
Oklahoma.o Moreover, the language "for the settlement of friend-
ly Indians" is consistent with the language used in the Treaty of
1866, which allowed the United States government to bring tribes,
friendly to the Cherokee Nation, into the Cherokee Outlet. 7
Although the label "reservation" is not determinative, it is in-
teresting to note that the Act of 1882, authorizing the Chilocco In-
dian School, does not refer to it directly as a reservation," and
neither does a bill passed by Congress in 1966, which provided for
the private sale of excess Chilocco lands." The committee report
which recommended passage of the bill' included a letter from
Undersecretary of the Department of the Interior, John A. Carver,
in which he stated: "The Chilocco Indian Industrial School, as it
was originally called, was a boarding school for friendly Indians
within the Indian territory, but it is now known as the Chilocco
44. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Executive Orders Relating To Indian Reservations 141
(1975) (Executive Order of July 12, 1884, President Chester A. Arthur).
45. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909).
46. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Executive Orders Relating To Indian Reservations 140
(1975) (Executive Order of July 9, 1895, President Grover Cleveland), (Executive Order of
July 12, 1895, President Grover Cleveland).
47. Treaty with the Cherokee Indians, 14 Stat. 799 (1866).
48..Act of May 17, 1887, ch. 163, 22 Stat. 68.
49. H.R. Res. 5380, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
50. H.R. REP. No. 1682, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). See also T. Fischbacher, A Study
of the Role of the Federal Government in the Education of the American Indian (1967)
(Published thesis, Arizona State University), at 102-108.
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Indian School and is an off-reservation boarding school .... "'
Therefore, the words of grant used in establishing Chilocco Indian
School are not conclusive in establishing that Chilocco is an In-
dian reservation.52
In addition to examining the legal history and words of grant
with respect to Chilocco Indian School, there are other important
factors to consider in determining whether the school constitutes
an Indian reservation within the statutory definition of Indian
country."3 Probably the most basic consideration is the tribal
aspect of an Indian reservation. In the case of Tooisgah v. United
States," the United States District Court for the Western District
of Oklahoma noted specifically that in using the term "Indian
reservation," "Congress chose language carefully designed to
recognize the sovereign jurisdiction of a state unless the offense
was committed in a place set apart for the government of the In-
dians as a tribe.""5 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has
also recognized the tribal character of an Indian reservation."
Chilocco Indian School possesses none of the tribal
characteristics usually found on an Indian reservation. The school
was not established for the use of one tribe, even though it was in
close proximity to the Ponca and Pawnee reservations. 7 Any
"friendly Indian" within the Indian Territory, who was not other-
wise provided for, could attend the school." Today, in fact,
students from several different states attend the school." The
school facilities are no longer restricted to the exclusive use of In-
dian students, and any non-Indian student may attend, condi-
tional upon vacancies in the school and upon payment of tuition.'
Furthermore, there is no tribal government at Chilocco which
could assume jurisdiction of the school.
In addition to the tribal aspect of an Indian reservation, there
are other relevant factors to be considered in determining whether
Chilocco Indian School qualifies as a reservation. In United States
51. H.R. REP. No 1682, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (emphasis added).
52. The Chilocco Indian School Reserve has been referred to as a "reservation" on
several occasions. Lee v. Ellis, 16 Okla. 24, 83 P. 715 (1905); McCalla v. Acker, 15 Okla.
52, 78 P. 223 (1904); Act of Feb. 14, 1920, 41 Stat. 408, ch. 75, § 17; Act of June 30, 1919, 41
Stat. 3, ch. 4, § 17; Act of May 18, 1916, 39 Stat. 123, ch. 125, § 17; Act of June 21, 1906,
ch. 3504.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).
54. 186 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1950).
55. Id. at 99. Contra, United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
56. See Ellis v. State, Okla. Cr., 386 P.2d 326, 330 (1963).
57. Act of May 17, 1887, ch. 163, 22 Stat. 68, 85.
58. Id. at 85.
59. H.R. Res. 5380, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
60. 25 C.F.R. § 31.3 (1977).
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v. Myers,' an early federal case involving the Rainy Mountain In-
dian School, located in Oklahoma, the Court considered the ques-
tion of whether the school was Indian country within the meaning
of Section 1151 of Title 18, United States Code. In holding that the
school was not Indian country, the Court recognized that several
related factors are involved in such a determination: "Whether a
reservation for any purpose affecting Indians is of a character suf-
ficient to stamp such lands as Indian country within the meaning
of the law must depend upon the scope of the act creating it, and
the nature of the title, use, and occupancy, how held, exercised
and enjoyed.""
Therefore, one important indicator of a reservation is the nature
of the title, use, and occupancy of the land in question. In Myers,
the Court states:
The term [Indian country] does not apply to any tract owned
and controlled by the government and devoted by it,
whether as a so-called reservation or mere foundation, to the
benefit of the Indians, exclusively or otherwise, unattended
by any semi-independent use and occupancy involving such
title, ownership, and control as has always inhered in the In-
dians as a distinct people and not merely as individual
wards.'
When the land on which the school is located was purchased
from the Cherokee Nation, title was vested in the United States
government, and no Indian tribe retained any interest in the land."
In creating the Chilocco Indian School Reserve, the government
retained title to the lands comprising the reserve and merely
granted the use and occupancy to certain individual Indians.0' It is
evident from the words of grant that individual Indians are enti-
tled to the title, use, and occupancy of the lands for a specific
limited purpose.' This grant of land for a limited use has more of
the characteristics of treatment of Indians as individual wards and
not as a semi-autonomous, distinct people, as described in the
Myers case. In short, the language of the Court in Myers, in an
analogous situation, is equally applicable to the instant case: "It
follows that this setting apart of a limited tract of the public do-
61. 206 F. 387 (8th Cir. 1913).
62. Id. at 394.
63. Id.
64. Treaty with the Cherokee Indians, 14 Stat. 799 (1866).
65. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Executive Orders Relating To Indian Reservations 141
(1975) (Executive Order of July 12, 1884, President Chester A. Arthur).
66. Id.
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main for a school which the government devoted mainly, or even
entirely, to the training and education of Indian children, attend-
ing in their individual capacity, could not operate to convert that
tract into Indian country .... ,
Another factor to be considered is the actual treatment of the
school by Congress and the executive branch. A true Indian reser-
vation is land which has been reserved for the exclusive use of In-
dians, although actual occupation is not necessary for that status.Y
Originally, the Chilocco lands were reserved from other lands in
the Cherokee Outlet for the purpose of educating and housing
students and graduates of the school to be built thereon."'
However, over the past forty years the federal government has
altered the use of the property several times. In 1937, an Indian
homestead project was initiated on the property.' In 1946, a pro-
posal was made concerning the abandoned homesteads and the
establishment of agricultural plots for students at Chilocco."
Finally, in 1966, Congress passed an act allowing for the sale of ex-
cess school lands back to the Cherokee Indians.' None of these ac-
tions appeared to recognize any property right in any particular
tribe or individual Indian. In fact, the federal government could
even discontinue the operation of the school without the consent
of any Indian tribe or individual because there is no agreement or
treaty which gives any Indian an enforceable right to challenge
such action.73
Considering all the relevant factors, then, it appears that the
Chilocco Indian School is not Indian country within the meaning
of Section 1151, although there is evidence to the contrary.
Although the school is not Indian country, the fact that the
Oklahoma constitution contains an express disclaimer of jurisdic-
tion over Indian lands,7 4 which was required by Congress as a con-
dition of admission to the Union, does not limit the state's authori-
67. 206 F. 387, 394 (8th Cir. 1913).
68. United States v. Martin, 14 F. 817, 822 (D.C. Ore. 1883).
69. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Executive Orders Relating To Indian Reservations 141
(1975) (Executive Order of July 12, 1884, President Chester A. Arthur).
70. 5 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS-LAWS AND TREATIES 643 (1941) (Executive Order No.
7546, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Feb. 1, 1937).
71. Memorandum Letter from the Secretary of the Dep't of the Interior to the President
of the U.S. Senate (Jan. 25, 1946).
72. H.R. Res. 5380, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
73. A recent article in The Daily Oklahoman, p. 1, Jan. 23, 1978, quoted Forrest J.
Gerard, Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, as saying that the
future of off-reservation schools, including Chilocco, is bleak due to decreasing enrollment
and rising costs.
74. OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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ty to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the school." However,
assuming arguendo that Chilocco Indian School was Indian coun-
try during the period in which Oklahoma was divided into
Oklahoma Territory and Indian Territory, there is evidence that
Chilocco is no longer under exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Upon creation of Oklahoma Territory and the Indian Territory
under the Act of May 2, 1890,' the United States district courts in
both territories were given jurisdiction over crimes committed by
Indians against Indians of other tribes to the same extent as if such
crimes were committed by citizens.77 These district courts had a
dual role. As United States courts they enforced the federal laws,
and as territorial courts they enforced the territorial laws, 8 which
at the outset were the laws of Nebraska in the Oklahoma
Territory 9 and the laws of Arkansas in the Indian Territory." As
United States courts, they had jurisdiction over crimes committed
by white persons against either Indians or other persons.8' As ter-
ritorial courts, they lacked jurisdiction over acts committed by In-
dians of the same tribe."
In 1897, this situation was completely altered. The Act of 1897"
placed in the United States territorial courts jurisdiction over all
crimes committed by any person in the Indian Territory, and the
laws of Arkansas were made to apply to all persons, regardless of
race. Once the tribal jurisdiction was abolished, 4 the essential
characteristics of Indian country were eliminated. This conclusion
is supported by the grant of citizenship to every Indian in Indian
Territory" and by the last proviso in the Act of May 8, 1906,"
which provided that the Indians in Indian Territory should not be
covered by the provision subjecting all Indian allottees to the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the United States until the issuance of fee
simple patents. Upon the organization of the state of Oklahoma,"
75. Clinton, supra note 1, at 564, states: "The requirement of congressional consent to
the exercise of state jurisdiction applies only to jurisdiction over crimes committed within
Indian country. The states have jurisdiction regardless of a disclaimer provision, by virtue
of their admission to the Union on an equal footing with sister states, over crimes commit-
ted by or against Indians outside of Indian lands.'"
76. Act of May 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 81.
77. Id. at 26 Stat. 88, 97.
78. Brown v. United States, 146 F. 975, 976 (8th Cir. 1906).
79. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 11, 26 Stat. 81, 87.
80. Id. at 26 Stat. 94.
81. Brown v. United States, 146 F. 975 (8th Cir. 1906).
82. Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, 26 Stat. 81, 88, 97.
83. Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3.30 Stat. 62, 83.
84. Id.
85. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 869, 31 Stat. 1447.
86. Act of May 8, 1906. ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182.
87. Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, § 19, 34 Stat. 267, 177.
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the state courts succeeded to the jurisdiction of the territorial
courts. The state courts apparently acquired criminal jurisdiction
over all Indians in the former Indian Territory." Because Chilocco
was clearly part of Indian Territory, the Oklahoma state courts
appear to have concurrent jurisdction over criminal matters aris-
ing on the school grounds.
Concurrent Jurisdiction
Although Chilocco Indian School apparently is not properly
classified as Indian country, it is located on land in the federal
public domain."0 However, there is authority to support the con-
tention that Oklahoma state courts have jurisdiction to prosecute
crimes committed on the federal public domain.'
The case of State v. Cline&' is the leading decision on this issue in
Oklahoma. In this case, the court considered the issue of exclusive
federal jurisdiction over land within the boundary of a state and
concluded that in the absence of a specific reservation of federal
jurisdiction, the rights of the United States government are only
proprietary in nature. It is clear from a reading of Section 7 of the
Oklahoma Enabling Act"2 that no express reservation was made by
the federal government of the land now in question. The state of
Oklahoma has never relinquished that jurisdiction by consent or
cession, and, therefore, the federal government has less than ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the public domain unless and until Con-
gress makes a determination that it will deal exclusively with the
subject. 3
In 1957, and again in 1962, the General Services Administration
undertook the task of compiling an inventory concerning the
jurisdiction of all federally owned land in the United States."4 In
that survey, Chilocco Indian School is considered to be only pro-
prietary property.' A proprietarial interest, as defined by the
88. ExparteNowabbi, 60 Okla. Cr. 111, 61 P.2d 1139(1936).
89. G.S.A. Circular No. 275, p. 628 (1962).
90. DeMarrias v. State, 319 F.2d 845, 846 (8th Cir. 1963).
91. 322 P.2d 208 (Okla. Cr. App. 1958). The Cline case was the controlling opinion
cited by the Field Solicitor of the Tulsa, Oklahoma Regional Office, Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs, to the District Commander, Oklahoma Highway Patrol, Lawton, Okla., in a 1972
opinion concerning jurisdiction over Chilocco Indian School. The same conclusion had
been reached several years before, in 1967, in an agreement between the United States At-
torney B. Andrew Potter, and the Acting Regional Solictor, Dep't of the Interior, Tulsa,
Oklahoma Region, Lewis J. Bicking.
92. Act of June 16, 1906. 34 Stat. 267.
93. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Phillips Pet. Co., 406 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1969); Texas Oil
& Gas Corp. v. Phillips Pet. Co., 277 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Okla. 1967).
94. G.S.A. Circular No. 275 (1962).
95. Id. at 628.
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General Services Administration, is one wherein the federal
government has acquired some right of title to an area in a state,
but has not obtained any measure of the state's authority over the
area."' Therefore, the state of Oklahoma can claim criminal
jurisdiction over Chilocco Indian School on the basis of agency
classifications and agreements, even though Chilocco is part of the
federal public domain. Therefore, there is evidence that the state
of Oklahoma and the United States government have concurrent
jurisdiction over the Chilocco Indian School.
Conclusions and Recommen dations
The Chilocco Indian School and the land on which it is located
doe not constitute Indian country within the meaning of Section
1151 of Title 18 of the United States Code. Although the evidence
is conflicting, consideration of the circumstances suggests that the
Chilocco Indian School Reserve is not an Indian reservation. Such
circumstances include (1) the fact that there is no tribal organiza-
tion at Chilocco; (2) no individual Indian or tribe has any legally
binding authority to continue or discontinue the present use of
Chilocco; (3) the school was created by congressional action, and
not as the result of a treaty or other agreement with an Indian tribe
or Indian community; and (4) the treatment of the lands involved
has been inconsistent with usual treatment of lands belonging to
Indian reservations or individual Indians. Any past claim that
Chilocco was Indian country was dissolved when Indian Territory
became part of the state of Oklahoma.
Although part of the federal public domain, Chilocco Indian
School is classified as proprietary and, therefore, the state of
Oklahoma has concurrent jurisdiction over the area.
This concurrent jurisdiction can pose potential multiple pro-
secution problems if both the state and federal governments
choose to exercise jurisdiction over the area. The double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
does not prevent such multiple prosecutions." Multiple prosecu-
tions would certainly be an undesirable consequence of concurrent
jurisdiction, and state and federal officials should work together
to avoid this danger.
The confusion which exists today over which unit of govern-
ment has the authority to police Indian schools such as Chilocco
can lead to two undesirable situations. First, it is undesirable to
96. Id. at 12.
97. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959; Bartkas v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol6/iss1/7
have any unit of government policing the schools if it is ill-
equipped to manage the unique law enforcement problems of an
Indian school. Second, confusion over jurisdiction can lead to a
legal vacuum in which there is no law enforcement.
It is clear that Indian schools must be protected from crime."
However, the proper unit of government to handle this task is not
clear. On one hand, the Bureau of Indian Affairs has an obligation
to insure law enforcement at Indian schools in order to protect in-
dividuals and property from harm. On the other hand, the District
Attorney's office in Kay County, Oklahoma, has assumed
jurisdiction over Chilocco at the present time. Perhaps the best
solution would be for the federal government to commission In-
dian police officers with the powers of arrest at Indian schools.- In
any event, sensible law enforcement services must be provided to
Indian schools without constituting an undue interference with the
educational process.
98. In The Daily Oklahoman, May 26, 1977, p. 57, Mary McCormick, elected principal
chief of the Sac and Fox, was quoted as saying of the lack of law enforcement at Indian
schools in Oklahoma, "We need protection .... Last Thursday night, 13 people entered our
land and did $5,000 to $6,000 in damage .... The city and county people are arguing
jurisdiction, while the people who did the vandalism are getting away."
99. Authority currently exists for the B.I.A. Indian Police. 25 C.F.R. § 11.301-.306
(1977). However, this applies only to reservations.
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